Thanks to Patricia Landolt, Susanne Jonas and Bill Robinson for their comments on an earlier draft.

In order to contribute to the further realization of the goals of democracy, equality, liberty and material well-being we need to comprehend the recent history of Guatemala in long-run comparative and historical perspective. The trajectory of Guatemalan social change needs to be understood in the context of the larger world-system within which Guatemalan development has occurred and is occurring. This requires not only a knowledge of the people and institutions of Guatemala, but a historical-structural understanding of Central America, the Americas and the global political economy.

The theoretical perspective that is best suited to such a temporally deep and spatially broad analysis is the world-systems perspective (Shannon 1996). A scientifically valid theoretical perspective can be powerful tool for social movements that seek to transform the world. The world-systems approach looks at human institutions over long periods of time and employs the spatial scale that is necessary for comprehending whole interaction systems. It is neither Eurocentric nor core-centric, at least in principle. The main idea is simple: human beings on Earth have been interacting with one another in important ways over broad expanses of space since the emergence of ocean-going transportation in the fifteenth century. Before the incorporation of the Americas into the Afroeurasian system there were many local and regional world-systems (intersocietal networks) in the Americas. These were inserted into the expanding European-centered system largely by force, and the surviving populations of indigenous Americans were mobilized to supply labor for a colonial economy that was repeatedly reorganized according to the changing geopolitical and economic forces emanating from the European and (later) North American core societies.

This whole process can be understood structurally as a stratification system composed of economically and politically dominant core societies (themselves in competition with one another) and dependent peripheral and semiperipheral regions, some of which have been successful in improving their positions in the larger core/periphery hierarchy while most have simply maintained their relative positions.

This structural perspective on world history allows us to analyze the cyclical features of social change and the long-term trends of development in historical and comparative perspective. We can see the development of the modern world-system as driven primarily by capitalist accumulation and geopolitics in which businesses and states compete with one another for power and wealth. Competition among states and capitals is conditioned by the dynamics of struggle among classes and by the resistance by peripheral and semiperipheral peoples to domination from the core. It is not possible to understand the history of social change in the system as a whole without taking into account both the strategies of the winners and the strategies and organizational actions of those who have resisted domination and exploitation.

This approach requires that we think structurally. We must be able to abstract from the particularities of the game of musical chairs that constitutes uneven development in the system to see the structural continuities. The core/periphery hierarchy remains, though some countries have moved up or down. The interstate system remains, though the internationalization of capital has perhaps further constrained the abilities of states to structure national economies. States have always been subjected to larger geopolitical and economic forces in the world-system, and as is still the case, some have been more successful at exploiting opportunities and protecting themselves from liabilities than others.

In this perspective many of the phenomena that have been called "globalization"correspond to recently expanded international trade, financial flows and foreign investment by transnational corporations and banks. Rather than a wholly unique and new phenomenon, globalization is primarily international economic integration, and as such it is a feature of the world-system that has been increasing for centuries. The globalization discourse generally assumes that until recently there were separate national societies and economies, and that these have now been superseded by an expansion of international integration driven by information and transportation technologies. The world-systems perspective, on the other hand, argues that national societies have for centuries been parts of a larger international system in which transnational and international economic and geopolitical forces have importantly conditioned the development of national societies and economies. The Great Chartered Companies of the seventeenth century were already playing an important role in shaping the development of world regions. Certainly the transnational corporations of the present are much more important players, but the point is that "foreign investment' is not an institution that only became important since 1970 (nor since World War II). Giovanni Arrighi (1994) has shown that finance capital has been an important component of the commanding heights of the world-system since the fourteenth century. The current floods and ebbs of world money are typical of the late phase of very long "systemic cycles of accumulation."

Types of globalization

The discourse about globalization has used this term to mean several different things. For some globalization means a new stage of global capitalism that is qualitatively different from a prior stage that recently ended, though the ways in which it is alleged to be different vary from author to author. I will distinguish between two main meanings of the term "globalization" :

• international integration, and
• the political-ideological discourse of global competitiveness.

Globalization as international integration needs to be further unpacked as international economic integration, international political integration and international cultural and communications integration. Of course each of these subtypes has many aspects. But the point here is that the question of international integration is an objective problem of the extensiveness and intensity of links in a set of global networks of interaction. We can determine empirically how economically integrated were the societies on Earth in the late nineteenth century and how "economically globalized" the world economic network is now (Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Nikitin 1998). This is a question which is separable from the consciousness that people have about their linkages with one another. The question of consciousness regarding linkages (social cosmology) also needs to be studied, and this second main type of globalization will also be considered below.

Economic globalization is both a long-term trend and a cyclical phenomenon.

If we calculate the ratio of international investments to investments within countries, the world economy had nearly as high a level of "investment globalization" in 1910 as it did in 1990 (Bairoch 1996). Similarly, if we calculate the ratio of total world international exports to the sum of all the country GDPs, there was a very high peak of "trade globalization" just before World War I, with a rapid decrease thereafter until 1950 and then a slow rise to the current very high level of trade globalization (See Figure 1).

The point here is that globalization as international economic integration needs to be understood as part of a long-term set of processes that have characterized the world-system for centuries. This model of the structural constants, cycles and secular trends specifies the basic and normal operations of the system, and I argue elsewhere that this basic schema continues to describe the system in the current period of global capitalism (Chase-Dunn forthcoming).

Schema of world-system constants, cycles and trends

The structural constants are:

1. Capitalism -- the accumulation of resources by means of the production and sale of commodities for profit;

2. The interstate system -- a system of unequally powerful sovereign national states that compete for resources by supporting profitable commodity production and by engaging in geopolitical and military competition;

3. The core/periphery hierarchy -- in which core regions have strong states and specialize in high-technology, high-wage production while peripheral regions have weak states and specialize in labor-intensive and low-wage production.

These structural features of the modern world-system are continuous and reproduced. Elsewhere I argue that they are interlinked and interdependent with one another such that any real change in one would necessarily alter the others in fundamental ways (Chase-Dunn, 1989).

In addition to these structural constants, there are two other structural features that I see as continuities even though they involve patterned change. These are the systemic cycles and the systemic trends. The basic systemic cycles are:

1.The Kondratieff wave (K-wave) -- a worldwide economic cycle with a period of from forty to sixty years in which the relative rate of economic activity increases (during "A-phase" upswings) and then decreases (during "B-phase" periods of slower growth or stagnation).

2. The hegemonic sequence -- the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers in which military power and economic comparative advantage are concentrated into a single hegemonic core state during some periods and these are followed by periods in which wealth and power are more evenly distributed among core states. Examples of hegemons are the Dutch in the seventeenth century, the British in the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth century.

3. The cycle of core war severity -- the severity (battle deaths per year) of wars among core states (world wars) displays a cyclical pattern which has closely tracked the K-wave since the sixteenth century (Goldstein, 1988).

4. The oscillation between market trade versus more politically structured interaction between core states and peripheral areas. This is related to cycles of colonial expansion and decolonization and is manifesting itself in the current period in the form of emergent regional trading blocs that include both developed and less-developed countries.

The systemic trends that are normal operating procedure in the modern world-system are:

1. Expansion and deepening of commodity relations -- land, labor and wealth have been increasingly mediated by market-like institutions in both the core and the periphery.

2. State-formation -- the power of states over their populations has increased everywhere, though this trend is sometimes slowed down by efforts to deregulate. State regulation has grown secularly while political battles rage over the nature and objects of regulation.

3. Increased size of economic enterprises -- while a large competitive sector of small firms is reproduced, the largest firms (those occupying what is called the monopoly sector) have continuously grown in size. This remains true even in the most recent period despite its characterization by some analysts as a new "accumulation regime" of "flexible specialization" in which small firms compete for shares of the global market.

4. International economic integration - the growth of trade interconnectedness and the transnationalization of capital. Capital has crossed state boundaries since the sixteenth century but the proportion of all production that is due to the operation of transnational firms has increased in every epoch. The contemporary focus on transnational sourcing and the single interdependent global economy is the heightened awareness produced by a trend long in operation.

5. Increasing capital-intensity of production and mechanization -- several industrial revolutions since the sixteenth century have increased the productivity of labor in agriculture, industry and services.

6. Proletarianization -- the world work force has increasingly depended on labor markets for meeting its basic needs. This long-term trend may be temporarily slowed or even reversed in some areas during periods of economic stagnation, but the secular shift away from subsistence production has a long history that continues in the most recent period. The expansion of the informal sector is part of this trend despite its functional similarities with earlier rural subsistence redoubts.

7. The growing gap -- despite exceptional cases of successful upward mobility in the core/periphery hierarchy (e.g. the United States, Japan, Korea, Taiwan) the relative gap in incomes between core and peripheral regions has continued to increase, and this trend has existed since at least the end of the nineteenth century, and probably before.

8. International political integration - the emergence of stronger international institutions for regulating economic and political interactions. This is a trend since the rise of the Concert of Europe after the defeat of Napoleon. The League of Nations, the United Nations and such international financial institutions as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund show an upward trend toward increasing global governance.

An abstracted illustration of this schema is presented in Figure 2.

The cyclical trend of international economic integration needs to be understood in the context of these other cycles and trends. Of special importance for the topic of Guatemalan development and democracy is the trend toward international political integration - the slow emergence of a world state. Guatemalan democracy cannot come into existence or long survive in a larger system that is undemocratic, and so both national and international politics must be a part of the building of Guatemalan democracy.

The trends and cycles reveal important continuities and imply that future struggles for economic justice and democracy need to base themselves on an analysis of how earlier struggles changed the scale and nature of development in the world-system. While some populists have suggested that progressive movements should employ the tools of economic nationalism to resist the powers of the "global princes of capital" (e.g. Moore 1995, Mander and Goldsmith 1996), it is here submitted that political globalization of popular movements will be required in order to create a democratic and collectively rational global commonwealth.

The globalization project

The term globalization has been used in a different way to refer to "the globalization project" - the abandoning of Keynesian models of national development and a new emphasis on deregulation and opening national commodity and financial markets to foreign trade and investment (McMichael 1996). This is to point to the ideological aspects of the recent wave of international economic integration. The term I prefer for this turn in global discourse is "neo-liberalism." The world-wide decline of the political left may have predated the revolutions of 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union, but it was certainly also accelerated by these events. The structural basis of the rise of the globalization project is the new level of integration reached by the global capitalist class. The internationalization of capital has long been an important part of the trend toward economic globalization. And there have been many claims to represent the general interests of business before. Indeed every modern hegemon has made this claim. But the real integration of interests of the capitalists in each of the core states has reached a level greater than ever before.

This is the part of the model of a global stage of capitalism that must be taken most seriously, though it can certainly be overdone. The world-system has now reached a point at which both the old interstate system based on separate national capitalist classes, and new institutions representing the global interests of capitalists exist and are powerful simultaneously. In this light each country can be seen to have an important ruling class fraction that is allied with the transnational capitalist class.

Neo-liberalism began as the Reagan-Thatcher attack on the welfare state and labor unions. It evolved into the Structural Adjustment Policies of the International Monetary Fund and the triumphalism of global business after the demise of the Soviet Union. In United States foreign policy it has found expression in a new emphasis on "democracy promotion" in the periphery and semiperiphery. Rather than propping up military dictatorships in Latin America, the emphasis has shifted toward coordinated action between the C.I.A and the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy to promote electoral institutions in Latin America and other semiperipheral and peripheral regions (Robinson 1996). Robinson points out that the kind of "low intensity democracy" that is promoted is really best understood as "polyarchy," a regime form in which elites orchestrate a process of electoral competition and governance that legitimates state power and undercuts more radical political alternatives that might threaten the ability of national elites to maintain their wealth and power by exploiting workers and peasants. Robinson (1996) convincingly argues that polyarchy and democracy-promotion are the political forms that are most congruent with a globalized and neo-liberal world economy in which capital is given free reign to generate accumulation wherever profits are greatest.

The spiral of capitalism and socialism

The interaction between expansive commodification and resistance movements can be denoted as "the spiral of capitalism and socialism." The world-systems perspective provides a view of the long-term interaction between the expansion and deepening of capitalism and the efforts of people to protect themselves from exploitation and domination. The historical development of the communist states is explained as part of a long-run spiraling interaction between expanding capitalism and socialist counter-responses. The Russian and Chinese revolutions were socialist movements in the semiperiphery that attempted to transform the basic logic of capitalism, but which ended up using socialist ideology to mobilize industrialization for the purpose of catching up with core capitalism.

The spiraling interaction between capitalist development and socialist movements is revealed in the history of labor movements, socialist parties and communist states over the last 200 years. This long-run comparative perspective enables one to see recent events in China, Russia and Eastern Europe in a framework that has implications for the future of social democracy. The metaphor of the spiral means this: both capitalism and socialism affect one another's growth and organizational forms. Capitalism spurs socialist responses by exploiting and dominating peoples, and socialism spurs capitalism to expand its scale of production and market integration and to revolutionize technology.

Defined broadly, socialist movements are those political and organizational means by which people try to protect themselves from market forces, exploitation and domination, and to build more cooperative institutions. The several industrial revolutions, by which capitalism has restructured production and reorganized labor, have stimulated a series of political organizations and institutions created by workers to protect their livelihoods. This happened differently under different political and economic conditions in different parts of the world-system. Skilled workers created guilds and craft unions. Less skilled workers created industrial unions. Sometimes these coalesced into labor parties that played important roles in supporting the development of political democracies, mass education and welfare states (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). In other regions workers and peasants were less politically successful, but managed at least to protect access to rural areas or subsistence plots for a fall-back or hedge against the insecurities of employment in capitalist enterprises. To some extent the burgeoning contemporary "informal sector" in both core and peripheral societies provides such a fall-back.

The mixed success of workers' organizations also had an impact on the further development of capitalism. In some areas workers or communities were successful at raising the wage bill or protecting the environment in ways that raised the costs of production for capital. When this happened capitalists either displaced workers by automating them out of jobs or capital migrated to where fewer constraints allowed cheaper production. The process of capital flight is not a new feature of the world-system. It has been an important force behind the uneven development of capitalism and the spreading scale of market integration for centuries. Labor unions and socialist parties were able to obtain some power in certain states, but capitalism became yet more international. Firm size increased. International markets became more and more important to successful capitalist competition. Fordism, the employment of large numbers of easily-organizable workers in centralized production locations, has been partially supplanted by "flexible accumulation" (small firms producing small customized products) and global sourcing (the use of substitutable components from broadly dispersed competing producers). These new production strategies make traditional labor organizing approaches much less viable.

Socialists were able to gain state power in certain semiperipheral states and to create political mechanisms of protection against competition with core capital. This was not a wholly new phenomenon. As discussed below, capitalist semiperipheral states had done, and were doing, similar things. But, the communist states claimed a fundamentally oppositional ideology in which socialism was allegedly a superior system that would eventually replace capitalism. Ideological opposition is a phenomenon that the capitalist world-economy had seen before. The geopolitical and economic battles of the Thirty Years War were fought in the name of Protestantism against Catholicism. The content of the ideology may make some difference for the internal organization of states and parties, but every contender must be able to legitimate itself in the eyes and hearts of its cadre. The claim to represent a qualitatively different and superior socio-economic system is not evidence that the communist states were ever able to become structurally autonomous from world capitalism.

The communist states severely restricted the access of core capitalist firms to their internal markets and raw materials, and this constraint on the mobility of capital was an important force behind the post-World War II upsurge in the spatial scale of market integration and a new revolution of technology. In certain areas capitalism was driven to further revolutionize technology or to improve living conditions for workers and peasants because of the demonstration effect of propinquity to a communist state. U.S. support for state-led industrialization in Japan and Korea (in contrast to U.S. policy in Latin America) is only understandable as a geopolitical response to the Chinese revolution. The existence of "two superpowers" -- one capitalist and one communist -- in the period since World War II provided a fertile context for the success of international liberalism within the "capitalist" bloc. This was the political/military basis of the rapid growth of transnational corporations and the latest round of "time-space compression" made possible by radically lowered transportation and communications costs (Harvey 1989). This technological revolution has once again restructured the international division of labor and created a new regime of labor regulation called "flexible accumulation." The process by which the communist states have become reintegrated into the capitalist world-system has been long, as described below. But, the final phase of reintegration was provoked by the inability to be competitive with the new form of capitalist regulation. Thus, capitalism spurs socialism, which spurs capitalism, which spurs socialism again in a wheel that turns and turns while getting larger.

The economic reincorporation of the communist states into the capitalist world-economy did not occur recently and suddenly. It began with the mobilization toward autarchic industrialization using socialist ideology, an effort that was quite successful in terms of standard measures of economic development. Most of the communist states were increasing their percentage of world product and energy consumption up until the 1980s (Boswell and Chase-Dunn, Forthcoming: Chapter 1, Table 1).

The economic reincorporation of the communist states moved to a new stage of integration with the world market and foreign firms in the 1970s. Andre Gunder Frank (1980:chapter 4) documented a trend toward reintegration in which the communist states increased their exports for sale on the world market, increased imports from the avowedly capitalist countries, and made deals with transnational firms for investments within their borders. The economic crisis in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was not much worse than the economic crisis in the rest of the world during the global economic downturn that began in the late 1960s (see Boswell and Peters 1990, Table 1). Data presented by World Bank analysts indicates that GDP growth rates were positive in most of the "historically planned economies" in Europe until 1989 or 1990 (Marer et al, 1991: Table 7a).

Put simply, the big transformations that occurred in the Soviet Union and China after 1989 were part of a process that had long been underway since the 1970s. The regime changes were a matter of the political superstructure catching up with the economic base. The democratization of these societies is, of course, a welcome trend, but democratic political forms do not automatically lead to a society without exploitation or domination. The outcomes of current political struggles are rather uncertain in most of the ex-communist countries. New types of authoritarian regimes seem at least as likely as real democratization.

As trends in the last two decades have shown, austerity regimes, deregulation and marketization within nearly all of the communist states occurred during the same period as similar phenomena in non-communist states. The synchronicity and broad similarities between Reagan/Thatcher deregulation and attacks on the welfare state, austerity socialism in most of the rest of the world, and increasing pressures for marketization in the Soviet Union and China are all related to the B-phase downturn of the Kondratieff wave, as were the moves toward austerity and privatization in most semiperipheral and peripheral states. The trend toward privatization, deregulation and market-based solutions among parties of the Left in almost every country is thoroughly documented by Lipset (1991). Nearly all socialists with access to political power have abandoned the idea of doing anything more than buffing off the rough edges of capitalism.

The way in which the pressures of a stagnating world economy impact upon national policies certainly varies from country to country, but the ability of any single national society to construct collective rationality is limited by its interaction within the larger system. The most recent expansion of capitalist integration, termed "globalization of the economy," has made autarchic national economic planning seem anachronistic. Yet, political reactions against economic globalization are now under way in the form of revived ex-communist parties, economic nationalism in both the core and the periphery (e.g., Pat Buchanan, the Brazilian military, the Indonesian prime minister) and a growing coalition of popular forces who are critiquing the ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism (e.g., Ralph Nader, environmentalists, a resurgent labor movement that defeated the "Fast Track" legislation in the U.S., etc.) (see Mander and Goldsmith 1997).

Political implications of the world-systems perspective

The age of U.S. hegemonic decline and the rise of post-modernist philosophy have cast the liberal ideology of the European Enlightenment (science, progress, rationality, liberty, democracy and equality) into the dustbin of repressive totalizing universalisms. It is alleged that these values have been the basis of imperialism, domination and exploitation and, thus, they should be cast out in favor of each group asserting its own set of values. It is important to note that self-determination and a considerable dose of multiculturalism (especially regarding religion) were already central elements in Enlightenment liberalism.

The structuralist and historical materialist world-systems approach poses this problem of values in a different way. The problem with the capitalist world-system has not been with its values. The philosophy of liberalism is fine. It has quite often been an embarrassment to the pragmatics of imperial power and has frequently provided justifications for resistance to domination and exploitation. The philosophy of the Enlightenment has never been by itself a major cause of exploitation and domination. Rather, it was the military and economic power generated by capitalism that made European hegemony possible. These were legitimated in the eyes of the agents and some of the victims by recitation of the great liberal values, but it was not the values that mainly enabled conquest and exploitation, but rather the gunships and the cheap prices of commodities.

To humanize the world-system we may need to construct a new philosophy of democratic and egalitarian liberation. Of course, many of the principle ideals that have been the core of the Left's critique of capitalism are shared by non-European philosophies. Democracy, in the sense of popular control over collective decision-making, was not invented in ancient Greece. It was a characteristic of all non-hierarchical human societies on every continent before the emergence of complex chiefdoms and states. My point is that a new egalitarian universalism can usefully incorporate quite a lot from the old universalisms. It is not liberal ideology that caused so much exploitation and domination. It was the failure of real capitalism to live up to its own ideals (liberty and equality) in most of the world.

A central question for any strategy of transformation is the question of agency. Who are the actors who will most vigorously and effectively resist capitalism and construct democratic socialism? Where is the most favorable terrain, the weak link, where concerted action could bear the most fruit? Samir Amin (1990,1992) contends that the agents of socialism have been most heavily concentrated in the periphery. It is there that the capitalist world­system is most oppressive, and thus peripheral workers and peasants, the vast majority of the world proletariat, have the most to win and the least to lose.

On the other hand, Marx and many contemporary Marxists have argued that socialism will be most effectively built by the action of core proletarians. Since core areas have already attained a high level of technological development, the establishment of socialized production and distribution should be easiest in the core. And, organized core workers have had the longest experience with industrial capitalism and the most opportunity to create socialist social relations.

I submit that both "workerist" and "Third Worldist" positions have important elements of truth, but there is another alternative that is suggested by the structural theory of the world­system: the semiperiphery as the weak link.

Core workers may have experience and opportunity, but a sizable segment of the core working classes lack motivation because they have benefited from a less confrontational relationship with core capital. The existence of a labor aristocracy has divided the working class in the core and, in combination with a large middle strata, has undermined political challenges to capitalism. Also, the "long experience" in which business unionism and social democracy have been the outcome of a series of struggles between radical workers and the labor aristocracy has created a residue of trade union practices, party structures, legal and governmental institutions, and ideological heritages which act as barriers to new socialist challenges. These conditions have changed to some extent during the last two decades as hyper-mobile capital has attacked organized labor, dismantled welfare states and down-sized middle class work forces. These developments have created new possibilities for popular movements within the core, and we can expect more confrontational stances to emerge as workers devise new forms of organization (or revitalize old forms). Economic globalization makes labor internationalism a necessity, and so we can expect to see the old idea take new forms and become more organizationally real. Even small victories in the core have important effects on peripheral and semiperipheral areas because of demonstration effects and the power of core states.

The main problem with "Third Worldism" is not motivation, but opportunity. Democratic socialist movements that take state power in the periphery are soon beset by powerful external forces that either overthrow them or force them to abandon most of their socialist program. Liberation movements in the periphery have most usually been anti­imperialist class alliances that succeed in establishing at least the trappings of national sovereignty, but not socialism. The low level of the development of the productive forces also makes it harder to establish socialist forms of accumulation, although this is not impossible in principle. It is simply harder to share power and wealth when there are very little of either. But, the emergence of democratic regimes in the periphery will facilitate new forms of mutual aid, cooperative development and popular movements once the current ideological hegemony of neoliberalism has been challenged by the new egalitarian universalism and the scientific world-systems perspective.

Semiperipheral democratic socialism

In the semiperiphery both motivation and opportunity exist. Semiperipheral areas, especially those in which the territorial state is large, have sufficient resources to be able to stave off core attempts at overthrow and to provide some protection to socialist institutions if the political conditions for their emergence should arise. Tom Hall and I found that semiperipheral societies have played transformational roles in many earlier world-systems, an observation that we dub "semiperipheral development" (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: Chapter 5). Some semiperipheral societies have continued to be both upwardly mobile and transformative of social relations in the modern world-system. All the hegemonic core powers (the Dutch, the British and the United States) were former semiperipheral countries. John Markoff (1998) shows that innovations in democratic institutions tended to occur in semiperipheral countries in the nineteenth century. And semiperipheral regions (e.g., Russia and China) have experienced more militant class­based socialist revolutions because of their intermediate position in the core/periphery hierarchy. While core exploitation of the periphery creates and sustains alliances among classes in both the core and the periphery, in the semiperiphery an intermediate world­system position undermines class alliances and provides a fruitful terrain for strong challenges to capitalism. Semiperipheral revolutions and movements are not always socialist in character, as we have seen in Iran. But, when socialist intentions are strong there are greater possibilities for real transformation than in the core or the periphery. Thus, the semiperiphery is the weak link in the capitalist world­system. It is the terrain upon which the strongest efforts to establish socialism have been made, and this is likely to be true of the future as well.

On the other hand, the results of the efforts so far, while they have undoubtedly been important experiments with the logic of socialism, have left much to be desired. The tendency for authoritarian regimes to emerge in the communist states betrayed Marx's idea of a freely constituted association of direct producers. And, the imperial control of Eastern Europe by the Russians was an insult to the idea of proletarian internationalism. Democracy within and between nations must be a constituent element of true socialism.

It does not follow that efforts to build socialism in the semiperiphery will always be so constrained and thwarted. The revolutions in the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China have increased our collective knowledge about how to build socialism despite their only partial successes and their obvious failures. It is important for all of us who want to build a more humane and peaceful world­system to understand the lessons of socialist movements in the semiperiphery, and the potential for future, more successful, forms of socialism there.

Once again the core has developed new lead industries -- computers and biotechnology -- and much of large scale heavy industry, the classical terrain of strong labor movements and socialist parties, has been moved to the semiperiphery (Silver 1995, forthcoming). This means that new socialist bids for state power in the semiperiphery (e.g., South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, perhaps Korea) will be much more based on an urbanized and organized proletariat in large scale industry than the earlier semiperipheral socialist revolutions were. This should have happy consequences for the nature of new socialist states in the semiperiphery because the relationship between the city and the countryside within these countries should be less antagonistic. Less internal conflict will make more democratic socialist regimes possible, and will lessen the likelihood of core interference. The global expansion of communications has increased the salience of events in the semiperiphery for audiences in the core and this may serve to dampen core state intervention into the affairs of democratic socialist semiperipheral states.

Some critics of the world­systems perspective have argued that emphasis on the structural importance of global relations leads to political do­nothingism while we wait for socialism to emerge at the world level. The world­systems perspective does indeed encourage us to examine global level constraints (and opportunities), and to allocate our political energies in ways that will be most productive when these structural constraints are taken into account. It does not follow that building socialism at the local or national level is futile, but we must expend resources on transorganizational, transnational and international socialist relations. The environmental and feminist movements are now in the lead and labor needs to follow their example.

A simple domino theory of transformation to democratic socialism is misleading and inadequate. Suppose that all firms or all nation­states adopted socialist relations internally but continued to relate to one another through competitive commodity production and political/military conflict. Such a hypothetical world­system would still be dominated by the logic of capitalism, and that logic would be likely to repenetrate the "socialist" firms and states. This cautionary tale advises us to invest political resources in the construction of multilevel (transorganizational, transnational and international) socialist relations lest we simply repeat the process of driving capitalism to once again perform an end run by operating on a yet larger scale.

A democratic socialist world-system

These considerations lead us to a discussion of socialist relations at the level of the whole world­system. The emergence of democratic collective rationality (socialism) at the world­system level is likely to be a slow process. What might such a world­system look like and how might it emerge? It is obvious that such a system would require a democratically-controlled world federation that can effectively adjudicate disputes among nation­states and eliminate warfare (Wagar 1996). This is a bare minimum. There are many other problems that badly need to be coordinated at the global level: ecologically sustainable development, a more balanced and egalitarian approach to economic growth, and the lowering of population growth rates.

The idea of global democracy is important for this struggle. The movement needs to push toward a kind of popular democracy that goes beyond the election of representatives to include popular participation in decision-making at every level. Global democracy can only be real if it is composed of civil societies and national states that are themselves truly democratic (Robinson 1996). And global democracy is probably the best way to lower the probability of another war among core states. For that reason it is in everyone's interest.

How might such a global social democracy come into existence? The process of the growth of international organizations, which has been going on for at least 200 years, will eventually result in a world state if we are not blown up first. Even international capitalists have some uses for global regulation, as is attested by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Capitalists do not want the massive economic and political upheavals that would follow the collapse of the world monetary system, and so they support efforts to regulate "ruinous" competition and beggar­thy­neighborism. Some of these same capitalists also fear nuclear holocaust, and so they may support a strengthened global government which can effectively adjudicate conflicts among nation­states.

Of course, capitalists know as well as others that effective adjudication means the establishment of a global monopoly of legitimate violence. The process of state formation has a long history, and the king's army needs to be bigger than any combination of private armies which might be brought against him. While the idea of a world state may be a frightening specter to some, I am optimistic about it for several reasons. First, a world state is probably the most direct and stable way to prevent nuclear holocaust, a desideratum that must be at the top of everyone's list. Secondly, the creation of a global state that can peacefully adjudicate disputes among nations will transform the existing interstate system. The interstate system (mulitiple sovereignties in the core) is the political structure that stands behind the maneuverability of capital and its ability to escape organized workers and other social constraints on profitable accumulation (Chase-Dunn 1989: Chapter 7). While a world state may at first be dominated by capitalists, the very existence of such a state will provide a single focus for struggles to socially regulate investment decisions and to create a more balanced, egalitarian and ecologically sound form of production and distribution.

The progressive response to neoliberalism needs to be organized at national, international and global levels if it is to succeed. Democratic socialists should be wary of strategies that focus only on economic nationalism and national autarchy as a response to economic globalization. Socialism in one country has never worked in the past and it certainly will not work in a world that is more interlinked than ever before. The old forms of progressive internationalism were somewhat premature, but internationalism has finally become not only desirable but necessary. This does not mean that local, regional and national-level struggles are irrelevant. They are just as relevant as they always have been. But, they need to also have a global strategy and global-level cooperation lest they be isolated and defeated. Communications technology can certainly be an important tool for the kinds of long-distance interactions that will be required for truly international cooperation and coordination among popular movements.

It would be a mistake to pit global strategies against national or local ones. All fronts should be the focus of a coordinated effort. W. Warren Wagar (1996) has proposed the formation of a "World Party" as an instrument of "mundialization" -- the creation of a global socialist commonwealth. His proposal has been critiqued from many angles -- as a throw-back to the Third International, and etc. I contend that Wagar's idea is a good one, and that a party of the sort he is advocating will indeed emerge and that it will contribute a great deal toward bringing about a more humane world-system. Self-doubt and post-modern reticence may make such a direct approach appear Napoleonic. It is certainly necessary to learn from past mistakes, but this should not prevent us from debating the pros and cons of proposed action.

The international segment of the world capitalist class is indeed moving slowly toward global state formation. The World Trade Organization and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) are only the latest elements in this process. Rather than simply oppose this move with a return to nationalism, progressives should make every effort to organize social and political globalization, and to democratize the emerging global state. We need to prevent the normal operation of the interstate system and future hegemonic rivalry from causing another war among core powers (e.g, Wagar 1992; see also Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1998). And, we need to shape the emerging world society into a global democratic commonwealth based on collective rationality, liberty and equality. This possibility is present in existing and evolving structures. The agents are all those who are tired of wars and hatred and who desire a humane, sustainable and fair world-system. This is certainly a majority of the people of the Earth.

Implications for Guatemala

From the ground in Guatemala it must appear that most of what is written above is the dream of someone who lives on the moon. The enormous problems of everyday life for the vast majority of Guatemalans and the hectic pace of political events in the struggle to implement the Peace Accords make it difficult to consider the broad sweep of history or the possibilities for constructing a more egalitarian and sustainable world-system. Nevertheless, a historical understanding of the dynamics of capitalist development is a necessary tool if the people of Guatemala are to effectively respond to the challenges of the present and the future.

Social change activists in Guatemala and their friends elsewhere need to have a long-term perspective on what they are doing despite the demands of immediacy. This is one thing that the world-systems approach provides. Not only do we look at the long-run trajectories of the past but we consider the future in terms of at least a fifty year time horizon. Very few human actors actually do this, but I am convinced that such a deep perspective on time is an important and necessary element of an effectiveapproach to progressive social change.

This said, what can we expect of the world-system in the next fifty years that will be of relevance to Guatemala? The world has been in a K-wave downswing (B-phase) since the late 1960s. It is now going into an A-phase in which relative rates of economic growth will generally be higher. This is good news for social change activists, at least in some respects. The fiscal pressures on states will be less. Labor will be in demand. The possibilities for mobilizing workers and peasants will be greater than they have been because firms and states will be more willing to make compromises to keep things running smoothly.

There are downsides as well. The rate of ecological degradation will increase as more resources are used in production. And late in K-wave upswings, when states have a lot resources, is when wars occur among core states (Goldstein 1988). If the economic hegemony of the United States continues to decline vis-a-vis competing core powers (Germany, Japan, China) the world will enter a dangerous window of vulnerability to core warfare in the 2020s. This is of concern to all peoples, because the advent of a world war with weapons of mass destruction could lead to the annihilation of life on Earth. Another possible doom could result from catastrophic environmental disaster. Progressive movements everywhere need to do all they can to prevent these possible disasters and be ready to pick up the pieces and begin again on a new, more just and sustainable, basis if they should occur.

The slow emergence of a world state will require a sustained effort to democratize the global political institutions. As I have said above, I do not think that popular movements should act to block global state formation, but rather to build democratic and collective rationality into the new institutions. Regarding semiperipheral development, I predict that the most transformative institutional innovations and the most powerful challenges to capitalism will come from semiperipheral regions in the world-system. Mexico is the most obvious candidate that has direct relevance for the Guatemalan situation. This said, a country such as Guatemala, with great human and natural resources, may also be a fertile ground for transformational action, especially in an age of global politics. In some ways the smaller countries have a greater interest in the unexplored terrain of globalization from below.

What is needed here is a strong linkage between the trajectory of the world-system and the situation in Guatemala today. The theoretical perspective presented above would be much more useful if it were combined with a world-system history and formal comparative analysis that looks at the last 200 years in local, regional, continental and global frameworks from the focal point of the Guatemalan people. This research needs to be done. In its absence I will present a commentary on the current situation that uses insights from the long-term, large scale perspective presented above.

Most recent interpretations of Central American history paint a picture of each country having its own complicated and tumultuous history that has led by different paths to the same happy result: democracy (e.g. Paige 1997). A world-systems perspective produces a different portrait. The Central American countries have all been repeatedly restructured by world market forces and geopolitics. The landed colonial patricians were displaced by the agro-exporters (who ruled in alliance with the military), and these have in turn been supplanted by a new transnational elite of neo-liberals who seek to link the national economies more tightly with core capital and global markets. It is fascinating to compare the nineteenth century liberal ideology and policies of the Central American agro-exporting elites (science, reason, privatization of communal resources) with more recent neo-liberal ideology and policies -- competitiveness, fiscal austerity, deregulation and privatization. Both liberalism and neo-liberalism in Central America were (are) combinations of imported ideas and local adaptations that justify and facilitate new forms of exploitation and outmaneuvering of rivals.

Popular movements emerged during the twentieth century in Mexico and Central America in response to authoritarian rule, agrarian restructuring and grinding poverty, but the timing of these movements has varied from country to country depending on the shifting coalitions of elites and the changing nature of agrarian class relations in different regions. The actions and reactions of local rulers and the interventions of the United States have been influenced by the sequencing of rebellions and revolutions in Central America, Latin America and the rest of the world. The Guatemalan nationalist movement after World War II and the intervention by the United States to overthrow the elected government of Arbenz in 1954 (Gleijeses 1991) was distinctive regarding its timing. The other Central American countries had their popular upsurges and repressions in the late 1920s and 1930s.

John Markoff's (1996,1998) studies of waves of democratic movements and institutional inventions show that these occurred on an interactive world stage rather than in isolated trajectories in each country. This also needs to be said of the revolutions of the twentieth century. Both the rebels and the forces that sought to defeat them learned much from previous efforts elsewhere. The world-systems perspective encourages us to see both the uniquenesses of particular political situations and the overall picture of twentieth century resistance and repression. One irony of the differing sequences is the current situation in Southern Mexico and the quite different situation across the border in Guatemala. After thirty years of civil war Guatemalans are tired of killing and want to make the peace work, while in Southern Mexico a long-dormant situation is heating up.

I largely agree with the views on Central American social change presented by William Robinson (1996, 1998). There are two key aspects of Robinson's depiction that differentiate it from standard views. He sees in each Central American country the emergence of a new ruling class fraction that represents the interests of global capitalism and the recently emerged global capitalist class. This transnational elite promotes neoliberal policies and openness to global investment. Robinson calls this group the "New Right."

The other key difference between Robinson's analysis and the standard depiction of recent Central American history focuses on the outcome of the struggles that occurred in the 1980s. Most observers depict the eighties struggles as between agro-industrial dynasties in each country and popular forces representing workers and peasants. The outcome of the struggles was, in each case, a stalemate in which neither side could win, and so both sides were forced to compromise in a new democratic regime in which contention was shifted from the military to the political realm. This allegedly led to the establishment of democracy - contested elections in which popular parties compete on a strong footing with the parties of the elites.

Robinson adds the transnational elite to the equation and draws quite different conclusions. Rather than a stalemate, Robinson contends that the popular forces were mainly defeated in each country. The "democracy" that emerged was really polyarchy -- a system of elite-controlled elections in which the transnational elite (the New Right) gained the greatest share of power. This analysis is substantially accurate, but there are also important differences between Central American countries that need to be taken into account. I have already mentioned the differences in movement/repression sequences. But also, as Robinson points out, the strength of the neo-liberal fractions of the domestic elites varies substantially from country to country, and this fraction is perhaps weakest in Guatemala. It is also important to realize that the neo-liberal domestic elite may sometimes have interests that are in contradiction with the policies of the neo-liberal international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. And on these issues the domestic neo-liberals may join with the older landed elites in a common cause to defend Guatemalan "sovereignty" against the meddling of the international financial institutions (IFIs) and the U.N.

The Guatemalan case is also different from other Central American countries and Mexico in a number of other important ways. The existence of both poor ladinos and a large group of indigenous people has added a strong ethnic dynamic to intraclass and interclass relations in Guatemala. This ethnic division among the poor has made it easy for the rulers to pit exploited groups against one another. This element also operates in Southern Mexico, but is much less important in the other countries of Central America. The prospect for a cross-border (Guatemala/Chiapas) Mayanist alliance that coordinates and cooperates with the global indigenist movement (Wilmer 1993) could be a powerful force in regional politics. But the importance of a strong working alliance between indigenous and ladino popular groups cannot be overemphasized. Indigenous identity needs to include a class analysis so that common interests between Ladinos and Mayans can be conceptualized and organized.

The Guatemalan revolutionary armed struggle that began in the 1960s was never strong enough to directly threaten the power of the central government, but it did stimulate a huge repressive effort supported by the C.I.A. in which the official armed forces received massive resources and recruited large numbers of poor young men from both the ladino and the Mayan regions. This method of suppressing the revolt provided an avenue of employment and security that is now, ironically, being contracted in the period of the Peace Accords. This is probably the most important cause behind the current outbreak of kidnapping and robbery.

As mentioned above, the neo-liberal transnational elite in Guatemala, though now in control of the presidency, is not very powerful vis-a-vis the older agro-exporters and the military, at least in comparison with the other Central American countries and Mexico. The original Guatemalan "liberals" - the agro-exporting elite - are reticent to pay income taxes and so the Guatemalan government must fund itself mainly by extracting revenues from the poor by means of consumption taxes. The old ruling families have been able to find enough allies to prevent a tax reform that would put the state on a firmer fiscal basis. Without this even neo-liberal development projects have little hope of success.

The issue of tax reform is one in which at least some of the domestic neo-liberals may have more in common with the landed elites than with their transnational class allies as represented by the IFIs. On a recent visit to Guatemala Michael Camdesus, the head of the International Monetary Fund, explicitly stated the need for tax reform in Guatemala to put the state on a sound fiscal foundation. The Consultative Group (a subcommittee of the Group of Seven) is using its financial leverage (based on a huge commitment of loans and grants for development projects) to try to move the implementation of the Peace Accords forward (Ruthrauff 1998).

Globalization from Below or Delinking?

The strategy of globalization from below means linking up women's movements, labor struggles, indigenous movements and agrarian reform movements within regions and globally. Labor movements in Guatemala have already been partially successful in forging new implementations of the old notion of labor internationalism, and in mobilizing support from the United States and other core countries based on concerns about human rights and the labor provisions of international trade agreements (Frundt 1987; Armbruster 1998).

The problems of cross-border labor organizing and international labor solidarity are great, but the new organizational terrain of global capitalism requires new strategies (Stevis 1998). Because the globalization project has abrogated social compacts between business and labor within core countries, especially in the United States, there are new possibilities for cooperation among Latin American and U.S. workers and their organizations. John Sweeney, the president of the United States American Federation of Labor- Council of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) recently visited the leaders of independent unions in Mexico City. This willingness to look at new alliances is a welcome relief from the long-standing Cold War approach to labor internationalism that was AFL-CIO practice until recently. Armbruster (1998) reports that help from the AFL-CIO was an important factor in the organizing success of the workers at the Phillips-Van Heusen plant in Guatemala.

Women's movements in El Salvador have made important efforts to link their struggles with sympathetic groups in other Central American countries and in the United States. Indeed, these groups have explicitly advocated globalization from below. In Mexico the resurgent electoral left, the agrarian movements in Chiapas and Guerrero, and independent trade unions have found that common opposition to neo-liberalism is a uniting force. Some of the popular leaders in Mexico have made an effort to mobilize support from the United States, but not many yet see this as part of a larger effort to democratize both Mexico and the global system.

The emerging popular responses to globalization and neo-liberalism face an important and potentially divisive issue. One possibility for mobilizing against global capitalism is "delinking" and self-reliance. Another, and very different, approach is to respond to global capitalism by building global democracy. The world-systems perspective has much to offer regarding the consideration of the value of these options.

The neo-liberals have pronounced withdrawal from the capitalist world economy as unthinkable and many popular leaders seem to agree. The wonders of technology and communications are alleged to be the highest values, and only by playing the game of competitiveness can a developing country have access to these. But some critics are now questioning whether the "necessity" of openness to the global economy is worth the costs. This is a healthy response because it unmasks many of the ideological presuppositions of neo-liberalism. People need housing, clean water, and healthy food. It is not necessary to be able to program your hair dryer from your car radio. The hyperbole of wonders needs be popped, like the financial bubbles that abound in the virtual space of global money.

The notion that self-reliance is an anachronism needs to be examined in historical perspective. In long-run panorama, protectionism and national mobilization of development have been useful and successful strategies in the past. The semiperipheral national societies that later became hegemons in the Europe-centered world-system all utilized tariff protectionism and state-sponsored mobilization to move themselves up the value-added hierarchy. The communist states used self-reliance and socialist ideology to try to establish a new mode of accumulation, though they ended in trying hardest to catch up with core capitalism. According to neo-liberal liturgy free trade and the free movement of capital generates the most optimum development for all. But the successful practice of upward mobility in the world-system demonstrates the value that state intervention and protection of certain activities can have (Evans 1995). The trajectories of the communist states are also alleged to prove the worthlessness of state planning and self-reliant economic nationalism.

I would argue that these strategies did indeed work, though the utopias they were intended to forge did not actually result. Instead capitalism expanded and reincorporated the self-reliant. This picture of challenge and response needs to consider the higher degree of economic and political integration of the current world-system. It is undoubtedly more costly to drop out of more integrated system than to drop out of a less integrated one. So the costs of going it alone have increased. These costs have always been higher for small countries such as those in Central America. This is why small countries have a greater interest in cross-border cooperation among popular movements. But the institutions of nationalism and the existing rules of the interstate system make such cooperation difficult.

Popular movements in Guatemala face the issue of whether or not to focus on local and national-level institutions and alliances, or on international and global ones. Would it be more productive to focus on gaining increasing say in the national state and using national sovereignty as a means of providing protection from global market and geopolitical forces, or on the other hand, to make efforts to reform or revolutionize the world-system by making alliances and constructing institutions that promote popular democracy on an international regional or global scale? The national route has a long history and is supported by the existing institutions, while the international route is little understood and is in great need of imagination. Global democracy seems to be only a pair of words to most people in the world today. It can be defined abstractly, but what would it mean in practice?

As within countries, democracy is a contested concept. Robinson's critique of polyarchy within countries badly needs to be extended to a critique of global-level political institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. International regional and global political institutions should be governed democratically by the peoples whose lives they affect. This would mean popular participation in the election of representatives and in the decision-making of these institutions. Indeed, though the United Nations verification mission (MINUGUA) has played a valuable role in the Guatemalan peace process, the U.N. is itself in need of democratization.

Globalization from below means spending organizational and movement resources on alliances and institution-building at the international regional and global levels. In practice neither a purely national strategy nor a purely global one would work for Guatemala or any other country in the contemporary context. So the real problem is to decide upon the mix and to pursue coordinated and complimentary approaches.

Polyarchy and Beyond

Another issue in the Guatemalan situation is raised by Robinson's analysis. Guatemala has not yet really achieved polyarchy, let alone real democracy. Polyarchy, while it may be largely a smoke-screen for continued domination and inequality, is undoubtedly better than a country run by the military and over-run with death squads. The implementation of the Peace Accords has gone very slowly. Some observers have wondered if the current government is seriously committed to implementation. But the main problem is that the neo-liberal elite fraction is weak, so it cannot afford to push too hard on the military or the agro-exporting elite families who have mounted a tremendous resistance to the peace process. And indeed the neo-liberals share many interests in common with the older landed elite. Neither are anxious to pay taxes.

Globalization from below in concert with popular forces in other Central American countries and in Mexico would naturally be organized around opposition to neo-liberal policies and institutions. Regional-level demands such as a minimum wage for maquiladora workers could be an important component of this strategy. Opposition to neo-liberal policies could also serve as a unifying strategy for different kinds of popular movements within Guatemala.

It might be supposed that in the Guatemalan situation it would make tactical sense for the popular forces to ally with the transnational neo-liberals and the IFIs in the short run in order to attain concessions from the agro-export dynasties regarding the fiscal strength of the state and demilitarization. The implementation of the Peace Accords has at least the possibility of establishing the trappings of an electoral democracy with substantial participation from popular sectors. Demilitarization and the establishment of the rule of law may not be true democracy, but they are certainly better for the popular classes than the situation of terror that has long existed and that still exists in some regions of the country. Under these conditions one might conclude that the campaign against neo-liberalism should be postponed.

Like the local/global conundrum discussed above, this problem may seem worse than it actually is. The popular movements can tacitly cooperate with those domestic neo-liberals who are supporting demilitarization, state solvency and implementation of the peace accords, as well as with the IFIs. Recognition that neo-liberals are better than death squads is not so hard to explain to the grass roots.

This does not mean that popular movements should keep quiet. I do not agree with O'Donnell and Schmitter's (1988) conclusion that popular forces should refrain from pressing socio-economic or political demands until the transition to polyarchy is consolidated. Robinson (personal communication) argues, and I agree, that strong popular movements in Guatemala can provide the support that the global and local neo-liberals need to push through peace accord implementation.

Once electoral democracy with popular participation is firmly in place the campaign against neo-liberal policies can commence in earnest. In the mean time the popular movements need to learn about the history of the world-system and the globalization project. This, and the pursuit of further international popular alliances, will make it possible for Guatemalans to benefit from, and contribute to, globalization from below. Global democracy begins at home.

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